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Abstract
This paper analyses whether the effect of crime on growth depends on the
structural changes caused by transition. The result of the simple model suggests
that when the structure of economy changes, the cost of economically motivated
crime will also change; thus, affecting the impact of crime on economic perfor-
mance. Using data for some of the republics of the former Soviet Union, we find
support for this conjecture.
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1 Introduction
Crime imposes significant costs on the society due to the consumption of illegal
products and/or the negative externality associated with illegal activities (Czaban-
ski, 2008). As a result of the significance of the economic costs of crime, over the last
three decades an increasing number of studies have focused on this topic. However,
despite the growing research in this field, so far no empirical study on the impact
of crime examines how the transition from a command economy to a market based
economy influences the effects of crime on growth.
In order to address the aforementioned gap in the existing literature, we analyse
how the structural changes occurred during transition influence the impact of crime
on growth. To guide our empirical analysis, we develop a simple growth model
where the criminal activities affect economic outcomes, given the costs associated
with the criminal activities. Namely, in the model, we link both the cost of criminal
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activity and the gains from it to the structure of the economy. Based on the analysis
of the model, we obtain some insights into how the effect of crime on the economy
may change as the structure of the economy changes. We then provide empirical
evidence on how the effect of crime on economic growth has changed in some of the
former USSR economies during the 1985-2010 transition that had led to a change in
the structure of the economy in those countries.
In building our model we employ the reasoning proposed in the extant literature.
Specifically, in his influential paper, Becker(1968) provides an economic rationale to
criminal activities as well as optimal policies to combat illegal behaviour; that is, the
criminals respond to economic incentives in the same way as the law-abiding cit-
izens. The results of the model predict that the law enforcement depends on the
probability of detection of a crime and the severity of the punishment. Ehrlich
(1973) theoretically models the participation of individuals in illegitimate activi-
ties, and tests his model using US state data. He finds that inequalities increase
the level of crime, especially crime against property; while, the probability of being
caught discourages the crime. We follow Becker (1968) and Ehrlich (1973) in terms
of determining the incidence of crime, but also extend their approach by assuming
that parameters such as the probability of detection or the cost of criminal activity
also depend on the institutional aspects of the economy. In addition, the structural
changes in the economy influence criminal activities by altering both the marginal
productivity of criminal effort and the costs associated with crime.
In existing empirical studies, the effect of crime on growth has not been found
to be unambiguously negative. For example, the World Bank study (2006), based
on data from 43 countries for 1975-2000, reports results suggesting a strong nega-
tive effect of crime on growth. Càrdenas (2007) also finds a significantly negative
association between crime and per-capita output growth in a panel of 65 countries
using homicide data for 1971-1999. On the other hand, Mauro and Carmeci (2007)
find that crime has a negative impact on income levels but exerts no significant
long-run adverse effect on growth rates. Moreover, most of the published literature
(Glaeser et al., 1996; Fajnzylber et al., 2002a; 2002b) has focused on the determinants
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of crime; however, crime, as one of the determinants of economic growth, largely
remains neglected in the macroeconomic framework (Detotto and Otranto, 2010).
Olavarria-Gambi (2007) estimates an aggregate burden of crime for Chile in 2002 at
2.06 percent of the GDP.
As aforementioned, the relationship between crime and certain economic indi-
cators has been under some empirical scrutiny. One strand of the empirical studies
on the effect of crime attempted to explain the difference in economic performance
across countries due to the difference in the incidence of crime along with other
variables (Sandler and Enders, 2008; Barro, 1996; Gardenas, 2007; Gaibulloev and
Sandler, 2008). The other strand of the relevant empirical studies employ time series
estimation methods and examines whether there is a causal relationship between
crime and certain economic variables (Neanidis and Papadopoulou, 2013; Mauro
and Garmeci, 2007; Gardenas, 2007; Habibullah and Baharom, 2009; Detotto and
Pulin, 2009; Chen, 2009; Narayan and Smyth , 2004). Along the lines of the latter
literature, Detotto and Otranto (2010) address two questions: first, whether the eco-
nomic effect of crime depends on the level of the crime rate, and second, whether
crime affects the economy differently depending on the business cycle. However,
as there were no institutional changes in the subject country (Italy) during the ex-
amination period, Detotto and Otranto (2010) could not test the effect crime had on
growth as a result of changes in the structure of the economy. Given this gap in
the existing literature, this paper contributes by analysing and thus providing new
insights on the effect of crime on economic growth as a result of structural changes
in the economy.
Additionally, there are some shortcomings in the empirical literature stemming
from the use of proxies when it comes to crime rather than actual measures of
the degree of crime. Some studies (for example, Powell et al., 2010) using cross-
country data do not explicitly control for crime but instead use proxy variables such
as the "rule of law", "political stability", "civil liberties", "corruption rate", "govern-
ment leadership", "inequality" amongst other variables. We attempt to address this
shortcoming by using a measure of crime calculated based on the actual data of the
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number of crimes committed in country at a given period of time.
In terms of the broader framework pertaining to the analysis of economic growth,
our study is in line with the existing literature. In particular, Barro (1991) considers
various determinants of growth and finds that political instability negatively influ-
ences economic growth. In his study he uses two variables as measures of political
instability, the number of revolutions and coups per year and the number of political
assassinations per million of the population per year. He finds that across countries
both variables are statistically significant and negatively correlated with growth. In
another cross-country analysis of growth, Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) find that
political instability has a detrimental impact on growth, whereas a stronger rule of
law has a positive and significant effect on growth. Additionally, using a sample of
53 developing countries from 1984 to 1995, Poirson (1998) finds that stronger eco-
nomic security contributed significantly to private investment and growth. Specif-
ically, he finds that in the short run, reductions in expropriation risk and terrorism
influence growth positively, while in the long-run, corruption and contract repudia-
tion affect growth negatively in the long run. In view of the aforementioned works,
the framework we employ in this study assumes that the general institutional struc-
ture significantly influence the effect of crime on economic growth.
While there are number of studies examining the effect of crime on growth in
developing economies, no study to date examines the effect of crime on growth in
a transitioning economy. It is well-known that in the former Soviet Union coun-
tries, there was an expansion of illegal activities during the early years of transition.
Shelly (1995) attributes this phenomenon to the insecurity of capital, money laun-
dering, the growth of organised crime and the ineffective policies that were in place
to fight crime in Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) coun-
tries. The transition caused deep structural changes that might have also affected
how the criminal operate in the former USSR countries. For example, the transition
affected the structure of property rights significantly due to the large scale of pri-
vatisation programs implemented in al of the former USSR countries. In fact, it has
been highlighted that in early stages of the post Soviet transition, property rights
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were quite weak in most of the former Soviet economies (Sonin, 2003; Braguinsky
and Myerson, 2007a, 2007b). Although it has been highlighted that such economies
develop either a system with weak property rights and rent-seeking or with strong
property rights imposed by a dictator (see e.g. Hafer, 2006; Guriev and Sonin, 2009).
In light of this, our study attempts to gain new insights into the relationship between
crime and growth.
Our analysis yields the following results. The main result is that the private
property rights and other structural changes that emerged after the collapse of the
command economy played a positive role in decreasing the negative effect of crime
on economic growth. Specifically, we find that during the transition, decline in the
negative effect of crime can be attributed to the structural changes. This result is
indirectly supported by the finding of Detotto and Otranto (2010), who find dur-
ing recessions there in an increase in the negative effect of crime. Namely, given
that during the transition all the former USSR economies experienced an economic
recession, the expected increase in the negative effect of crime on growth was less-
ened by the structural changes in the economy. The main structural changes appear
to come in the form of increased productivity of crime (due to stronger organisa-
tion of crime) and reduced pool of felonious agents (most likely implemented by a
dictatorship-type governance). In addition, unlike Detotto and Otranto (2010), we
find that the marginal effect of crime depends on the level of crime. We explain this
difference as a result of the structural changes that had occurred during the transi-
tion of the economies of the former USSR that we consider in our empirical analysis.
2 Model
There are two types of agents: law-abiding and felonious. Assume that there is a
fixed measure of mass of citizens, λ, are potential criminals, while 1 − λ are the
law-abiding citizens.
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Criminal agent
A fraction ε ∈ (0,1) of felonious agents choose to be criminal. Those who are a
criminal-type choose the level of their effort, φt ∈ (0,1), in criminal activities. This
implies that the intensity of crime is determined by φtε. The criminals receive illegal
income from each victim, given as τt = θφt, where θ is the productivity of criminal
activities. One way to model this the productivity of criminals is to state it as a
function that depends on the wage rate in the economy, as with higher income of
the citizens, crime allows to capture more income for any given effort. We assume
that θ = θ0w
ζ
t , where θ0 and ζ < 1 are parameters. There are n =
1−λ
ελ victims per a
given felonious agent.
The criminals can be detected with probability, p, for their crimes, and incur
costs, xt. The magnitude of this cost depends positively on the extent of the crime
and this cost is increasing with the income generated in criminal activities; that is,
the worse the crime the higher the cost. For tractibility sake, we assume that this
cost can be captured by a quadratic function of the income from criminal activities.
In addition, there is externality from the overall criminal rate in the economy. The
more agents choose to be criminal the less becomes the cost of criminal activity.
Therefore, the cost faced by a felonious agent is given by:
x = η(1− ε)τt2, (1)
where η is an exogenous cost parameter. The probability of detection, p, along with
the parameters that drive the costs associated with crime depend on the economy’s
institutional setting.
We link the cost of crime to the structural changes that take place when an econ-
omy transitions from a command driven to a market driven economy. These result-
ing structural changes give rise to private property rights and protection, altering
the cost of running criminal activities, and hence, the effect of crime on economic
growth. This conjecture is based on the following analytical findings.
In order to capture the structural differences between the two types of economies,
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command versus market-based, we use the rationale given in Besley and Ghatak
(2010). They argue that in an environment where public ownership of capital is
combined with a socialist regime, the wage rate would be set below the incentive-
compatible level. In our context, this can be expressed as the optimal wage rate with
some level of tax, pi. In general, this formulation implies that the tax rate under the
command economy regime is higher than under the market economy regime. That
is, the effective wage rate for the agent is given as (1− pi)wt, where wt is the gross
wage rate. However, this does not imply that the effective wage rate is lower un-
der command economy by definition, as the effective wage rate also depends on
the gross wage rate, wt. Therefore, even if pi is higher in the command economy, if
the gross wage rate, wt, is high enough, then it is possible that the effective wage,
(1−pi)wt, is higher than in a market economy with lower taxes and gross wage rate.
If an agent is engaged in criminal activities, then he or she can work in the official
sector. This does not look far fetched. However, given that part of their time is
dedicated to criminal activities, the time spent working in the legal sector should
decrease. In light of this discussion, the income of the felonious-type agent is given
by  (1− pi)wt + rtk1t with prob. (1− ε)(1− φ)(1− pi)wt + rtk1t + φ[nτt − pxt] with prob. ε
where rt is the rate of return to capital and kt is the stock of capital per worker.
Given this, the felonious-type agent solves the following problem:
max
c,φ,ε
U =
∞∫
0
ln(c1t)e−ρtdt, (2)
s.t.
k˙1t = (1− pi)wt(1− εφt) + rtk1t + φ(nτt − pxt), (3)
τt = θφt, (4)
xt = η(1− ε)τt2. (5)
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To solve this problem, we construct a present-value Hamiltonian:
H = ln(c1t)e−ρt + v1[(1− pi)wt(1− φtε) + rtk1t + ε(nτt − pxt)]. (6)
The first-order conditions with regard to choice and state variables yield the follow-
ing:
∂H
∂c1t
=
e−ρt
c1t
− v1 = 0. (7)
∂H
∂φ
= v1
[
−(1− pi)wtε+ ε
(
nθ − 2pη(1− ε)θ2φt
)]
= 0. (8)
∂H
∂ε
= v1
[
−(1− pi)wtφ+ ε
(
pη(θφt)2
)]
= 0. (9)
−v˙1 = ∂H
∂k1t
⇒ v˙1 = −v1rt. (10)
From (8) we obtain the equilibrium share of criminal agents:
−(1− pi)w+ (nθ − 2pη(1− ε)θφ) = 0.
Solving this for ε,
ε∗t = 1−
(1− pi)wt − ηθ
2pηφθ
. (11)
Solving (9), we write:
ε∗ = (1− pi)w
pηφθ2
(12)
Equalising (11) and (12) we write:
1− (1− pi)wt − ηθ
2pηφθ
=
(1− pi)w
pηφθ2
. (13)
Solving (13) for φ we obtain:
φ∗ = (1− pi)w(2+ θ) + nθ
2
2pηθ2
. (14)
By analysing (14) and accounting for θ = θ0w
ζ
t , we can state the following.
Lemma 2.1 Criminal effort, φ, increases together with the wage rate if ζ < 1/2 and de-
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creases if otherwise. An increase in the cost of criminal activities or the probability of detec-
tion, reduces criminal effort.
By substituting for φ in (12) we obtain:
ε∗ = 2(1− pi)w
(1− pi)w(2+ θ) + nθ2 . (15)
Now, using (15), we state the following.
Lemma 2.2 The incidence of crime, ε, decreases together with the wage rate. An increase in
the spread of crime (lower n), increases the incidence of crime.
Accounting for θ = θ0w
ζ
t and using (14) and (15), we write that the optimal in-
tensity of crime, φ∗ε∗, as follows:
φ∗ε∗ = (1− pi)w
1−2ζ
pηθ20
(16)
Analysing the equilibrium value of the criminal intensity given above, we can
state the following:
Proposition 2.3 The criminal intensity decreases with the productivity of crime stemming
from institutional setting,(θ0), tax burden , (pi), the probability of detection (p), and the cost
associated with the crime (η). On the other hand, the criminal intensity increases with the
wage rate, w, if ζ < 1/2, and decreases if ζ > 1/2.
Proof The result is straightforward by considering the comparative statics of (16).
The above result indicates that a transition to a market economy as a result of an
increase in the effective wage rate raises both the opportunity cost of crime and
its productivity. However, which effect dominates is determined on whether the
marginal elasticity of productivity of crime is higher than a certain threshold or not;
that is, if ζ > 1/2 holds or not. Apparently, the productivity of crime depends on
the institutional environment. Thus, if the institutional setting is not facilitating for
criminal activities then rising wage rates result in falling criminal intensity. In addi-
tion to the above, other changes are possible as well; for example, the productivity
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associated with the criminal activities may rise due to a increase the value of param-
eter θ0. The value of θ0 may increase by weakened property rights and growth of
organised crime (Shelly, 1995; Sonin, 2003; Braguinsky and Myerson, 2007a, 2007b),
or it may decrease if the form of governance turns into a dictatorship type (Guriev
and Sonin, 2009). Whether these effects of structural changes actually take place is,
of course, an empirical question, which we will deal with in section 3.
Law-abiding agent
The law-abiding agent works full time at the firm and rents out all his capital to the
firm. If this agent falls victim to a criminal act with the probability of q, the agent
will incur a loss of his or her income, given by τ. The agent solves the following
problem:
max
c
U1 =
∞∫
0
ln(c2t)e−ρtdt, (17)
s.t.
k˙2t = (1− pi)wt + rtk2t − qτ, (18)
q =
ε(1− λ)
λ
. (19)
It can be verified that the optimisation problem faced by this type of agent leads to
a similar consumption growth rate as that of the felonious agent. That is,
c˙2t
c2t
= r− ρ. (20)
The firm
Due to constant returns to scale we can assume that there is only one firm in the
economy, which operates based on the following technology:
Yt = AKtα(Lt(1− φε))1−α, (21)
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where A is the productivity coefficient, Kt is the aggregate stock of capital, Lt is total
labour, 0< α< 1 is the output elasticity of capital . In per capita terms, we can write
yt = Akα(1− φε)1−α. (22)
We assume that the productivity coefficient A= A(φε) is such that A′φε < 0, A′′φε <
0. The firm maximises its profits according to the following:
max
k
Π = Akαt (1− φε)1−α − (1− pi)wt(1− φελ)− rkt. (23)
The solution to this problem is given as:
∂Π
∂k
= 0⇒ rt = Aαkα−1t (1− φε)1−α. (24)
The growth rate
Let us consider the effect of crime on the growth rate defined by equation (20). This
analysis leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 2.4 If the intensity of crime is falling in the wage rate (ζ > 1/2), the negative
effect of crime on economy’s growth is declining with further growth. However, this also
implies that if the intensity of crime is rising in the wage rate (ζ < 1/2), then the negative
feedback from crime to economic growth can limit growth rates and create a trap.
Proof Combining (17) and (24) we can write the growth rate of the economy as:
g =
c˙t
ct
= Aαkα−1t (1− φε)1−α − ρ.
It can be verified that ∂g
∂(φε)
< 0. Therefore, if economic growth that leads to higher
effective wage rates, (1−pi)w, also reduces the intensity of crime (i.e. ∂(φε)∂w < 0), then
both crime levels and its effect on economic growth decline. On the other hand, if
economic growth leads to a higher intensity of crime due to the condition ∂(φε)∂w > 0
holding, then this negative feedback would limit the rate of economic growth due
to ∂g
∂(φε)
< 0. 
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3 The Empirical Framework
We derive the empirical model from the above theoretical findings using the method-
ology employed by Mankiw et al (1992), MRW hereafter. Let us denote
kˆt =
Kt
ALt
, (25)
yˆt =
Yt
ALt
= kˆα(1− φε)1−α. (26)
The capital accumulation equation can be written as,
˙ˆkt = ityˆt − (n+ δ)kˆt, (27)
where it is the share of investment in total output, n is the rate of population growth,
δ is the depreciation rate of capital. Following MRW, we consider the steady-state
growth rate, where ˙ˆkt = 0. Then from (27) we find the capital stock per unit of
effective worker
¯ˆkt =
(
it
n+ δ
) 1
1−α
(1− φtε). (28)
By inserting the above expression for the steady state value of capital back into (26)
and taking logs, the steady state value of income per capita is derived as:
log yˆ∗t =
α
1− α log it −
α
1− α log(n+ δ) + log(1− φtε). (29)
This is the well-known empirical growth equation used by Mankiw et al. (1992).
This approach has been extended by Islam (1995) who demonstrates that the model
can be adjusted for panel data by approximating the pace of convergence around
the state level of output, y∗. This gives us a dynamic model where the adjustment
process towards the state is given by:
lnyˆt = (1− e−pi)lnyˆ∗ + e−pilnyˆt−1,
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where pi = (n+ δ)(1− α). After rearranging and substituting for y∗ from (29), we
arrive at:
lnyˆt − lnyˆt−1 =
(
1− e−pi)[ α
1− α ln i−
α
1− α ln (n+ δ) + log(1− φtε)− lnyˆt−1
]
(30)
By noting that lnyˆt = lnyt − lnA, where yt = Yt/Lt, (30) is transformed into the
following form:
lnyt =
(
1− e−pi)[ α
1− α ln i−
α
1− α ln (n+ δ) + log(1− φtε)
]
− e−pi (lnyt−1 + lnA) .
(31)
The panel-data empirical model based on the above equation can be expressed in a
conventional form as follows:
yjt = γyj,t−1 +
3
∑
m=1
(
β jXmjt + µj + νjt
)
, (32)
where yjt = lnyt, yj,t−1 = lnyj,t−1, γ = −e−pi, β1 = (1 − e−pi)
(
α
1−α
)
, β2 = −(1 −
e−pi)
(
α
1−α
)
, β3 = 1− e−pi, x1jt = ln ijt, x2jt = ln(njt + δ), x3jt = ln(1− φjtε j), and µj =
−e−pilnA. The stochastic disturbance terms are assumed to satisfy the following:
E[µj] = E[νjt] = E[µjνjt] = 0.
Since, the intensity of crime, φε is not directly observed, we use the crime rate
as a proxy. Hence, instead of ln(1− φε), we use ln(Crime). To determine the condi-
tions under which crime affects growth, we modify the basic empirical model (32)
by taking into account that the TFP, A, is a function of the crime rate. Specifically,
we postulate that the dependence between productivity and crime may change as a
result of the structural changes in the economy. In the empirical model, we imple-
ment this rationale by adding an interaction term between a dummy variable (equal
to 1 for post-Soviet period) and the crime rate. This dummy variable captures the
structural changes that take place during the transition period. The robustness of
the results is verified using the property rights indicator defined as the share of the
private sector in GDP.
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4 Data and Estimation
Several sources of data have been utilized in this study. The annual GDP series and
Population figures are collected from the Maddison dataset (Bolt & van Zanden,
2013). Net capital formation (investment) series are from the Official Statistics of the
Countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CISStat, 2013).1 As afore-
mentioned, the crime rate is used as a proxy for criminal intensity and is obtained
from CISstat for the entire period. The crime rate is calculated per 100,000 popu-
lation (that is, Total number of Crimes/Population x 100,000) and includes crimes
such as first degree/premeditated murder (including attempted), grave bodily in-
juries, thefts, robbery, bribery and crimes associated with narcotics. Crimes related
to hooliganism and rape have been excluded as these crimes are not necessarily
driven by economic incentives.
Using a total number of criminal acts as a measure of crime might be questioned
on the grounds that the different types of crime can have different prevalence and
economic consequences. However, when one is focused only on the incidence of
crime but not its nature (as soon as it has some economic consequence), using the
total numbers of criminal acts should be fine. As for the structural changes in crimi-
nal activity, we intend to gauge that through estimating its impact on overall income
measured by GDP. For estimation purposes, all series are transformed into logarith-
mic form. Following other studies in this area (see, for example, Schündeln, 2013)
the depreciation rate is set at a constant rate of 10 per cent for all countries. As a re-
sult of the scarcity of data for some countries, the sample contains the following 10
countries: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Rus-
sia, Tajikistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan. The dataset contains 260 observations and
covers the following time period, 1985-2010. Table 1 presents the summary statistics
of all the model variables.
Figure 1 exhibits the pattern of the crime rate and GDP per capita for the coun-
tries in the sample from 1985 to 2010. It is interesting to note that the crime rate
1The official statistics for net capital formation divided into two periods: pre- and post USSR
period. Pre USSR dataset had some overlapping years with post Soviet Union dataset. We had to
adjust pre Soviet Union figures based on the overlapping years accordingly for investment series.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Variable
name Variable Obs Period Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
GDP per
capita y 260 1985-2010 4851.2 2520.8 824.6 13658.5
Investment
per capita i 260 1985-2010 1321.6 955.6 49.9 5631.7
Population
Growth n 260 1985-2010 1.005 0.011 0.946 1.032
Crime Rate Crime 260 1985-2010 7.066 5.092 1.475 26.873
Property
Rights Prop 260 1985-2010 37.71 24.70 5.00 75.0
(dashed line) has been increasing in all of the CIS countries prior to the collapse of
the USSR. After the USSR collapse, a sharp decline can only be observed in Azer-
baijan (1993-2000), in Tajikistan (1993-2008) and in Uzbekistan (1993-1995). It is also
evident that in all countries, with the exception of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, the
post USSR crime rate on average is higher than the crime rate that prevailed during
the USSR.
In terms of economic growth, almost all countries experienced a decline during
the first few years of the transition. Some of the countries recovered from the prob-
lems of high inflation, low manufacturing, chaotic budget structures and declining
trade, by the mid 1990s; whereas sin countries such as Russia, Moldova and the
Ukraine, stagnation was observed up until 1998. Following the recovery from the
Russian financial crisis of 1998, robust economic growth was observed in all of the
CIS countries. The average growth rate between 2000 and 2008 was over 6 per cent.
This was a result of macroeconomic stability, high foreign investment, a decline in
government expenditures, fiscal discipline and tax reforms, rising energy exports,
structural reforms in manufacturing, agricultural and service sectors, as well as the
liberalization of trade in the major the CIS countries. The effects of the Global Finan-
cial Crisis on the CIS countries were minimal as the financial institutions were not
exposed directly to US credit markets. The CIS countries have been mostly affected
by the falling commodity prices, as a result of the global slow down in demand for
exports from these economies.
In Table 2 are the results of all the model specifications. In columns 1 to 4 are
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the conventional OLS estimates. In the case of the OLS estimates, we estimate Eq.
(27) using the fixed (FE) and the random effects (RE) estimator without the USSR
dummy, column 1 and 2, respectively; and, with the post-USSR dummy (1 for years
after 1991, and 0 otherwise), column 3 and 4, respectively. In order to address the
problem associated with country specific effects and the regressors, as highlighted
by Baltagi (1995) and Roodman (2009), we conduct a Hausman test. The result of
the Hausman test (Davidson and MacKinnon, 1982, 1993) shows that the country-
specific effects are correlated with the regressors in our model at least at the 5 per
cent significance level. Thus, the RE estimator is rejected in favour of the FE es-
timator. However, due to the presence of the lagged growth variable, the FE is
inconsistent (Baltagi, 1995).
Given the inconsistency of the FE estimator, in the presence of a lagged endoge-
nous variable, the potential endogeneity of other regressors and the number of in-
struments, we employ the system Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) esti-
mator for dynamic panel data.2 We use the GMM estimator, following Arellano
and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998), as it allows us to obtain consis-
tent and efficient estimates, given the aforementioned problems associated with dy-
namic models, as discussed by Baltagi (1995) and Roomond 1998). To confirm that
the GMM estimator is appropriate, we test for the hypothesis that the average au-
tocorrelation in the GMM residuals of order 1 and 2 is equal to 0. According to our
results, in all three GMM model specifications (without the post USSR dummy, with
the post USSR dummy, and the inclusion of property rights indicator, columns 5, 6
and 7 respectively of Table 2), the first and second-order autocorrelation are not vio-
lated and are at zero at the 5 per cent significance level. Additionally, the validity of
the moment conditions implied by the model is tested using the Sargan (1958) and
Hansen (1982) tests of overidentifying restrictions. Both tests confirm the choice of
the instruments in our model.
2For further details on the GMM estimator, refer to Holtz-Eakin et al. (1998) and Arellano and
Bond (1991).
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Figure 1: Crime rate (left axis, dashed line) and GDP per capita (right axis, dotted
line), 1985-2010 in the FSU countries
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In all model specifications, the lagged growth variable is positive and statistically
significant at the conventional significance levels. The investment variable is signif-
icant in FE and RE models with the expected sign but not significant in the GMM
estimations. The population and depreciation variables were found to be significant
at the 10 per cent level only with a negative sign in the RE and FE models with-
out the post USSR dummy but insignificant in all other models. It is worth noting
that population was shrinking rather than increasing in some of the CIS countries
partly related due to ageing and death related illnesses. The crime rate was found
to be statistically significant in all our models at the 1 per cent level and had the
expected negative sign. The dummy variable for the post-USSR period indicates
that the negative effect of crime on economic growth has actually reduced due to
the structural changes after the collapse of the USSR. This result can be interpreted
from two perspectives: (i) the productivity of crime driven by rising income levels
reduces crime effort, and hence, might mitigate its negative impact; (ii) as it was in-
dicated in Guriev and Sonin (2009), developing a dictatorship-type governance may
strengthen property rights, which, in turn, result in a positive impact on growth. The
18
robustness of the results is confirmed using the property rights indicator (Property)
defined as the share of the private sector in GDP, which is significant at the 1 per
cent level.
5 CONCLUSION
In this study we set out to find whether the transition from a command-driven econ-
omy to a market-based economy influences the effect of crime on economic growth.
First, we consider a simple model where some agents were felonious and commit
crime. By allowing for a structural difference between the two types of economies,
the results of the analysis demonstrate that the transition to a market economy may
reduce the negative effect of crime on economic performance. Especially, it would
be true if such a transition lead to a stronger property right protection. We tested
this conjecture empirically using data for 10 former Soviet Union economies from
1985 to 2010; the results of the empirical exercise confirm the theoretical findings.
However, in light of Guriev and Sonin (2009) arguments, stronger property rights
might also imply a more dictatorship-type governance emerging in those countries.
19
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